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BOOK COMMENT
THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM: THE NADER STUDY GROUP RE-
PORT ON ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT. Edited by Mark J. Green.
Washington, D.C. Pp. xiii, 1,148 (2 vols.). $27.00.*
The most durable characteristic of antitrust is controversy. Busi-
nessmen shrilly espouse and commend antitrust as a charter of free-
dom, but grumble about discriminatory and heavy-handed enforce-
ment. Commentators complain that at times antitrust statutes serve
as conduits through which inapplicable a priori economic theories
enter, with deleterious consequences, the mainstream of the competi-
tive process. John Kenneth Galbraith recently made more waves
by announcing that antitrust is obsolete, or at best negligible in
today's technostructure.' Decreeing that antitrust is "relevant" and
on a par with the high profile fields of poverty and ecology, a
small group of Ralph Nader associates now tailgate the procession
with an investigation of "the policies and procedures, the politics
and personalities which comprise the empirical reality of antitrust
enforcement. ' 2 The purported findings of their two-volume, 1,148-
page study can best be summarized as an indictment: the corporate
establishment, aided and abetted by the mis- and non-feasance of
Government, is wreaking havoc with the consumer and the economy,
while simultaneously subverting the nation's social and moral ethic.
Whatever the merits of the previous Nader Raider books,' The
Closed Enterprise System is an unsatisfactory piece of work. In the
strain to validate the charges, bias and overkill devour credibility
and balanced analysis. A self-perpetuating necessity to satisfy an
unsatiated constituency addicted to the Nader style of muckraking
propels the authors into the realm of sweeping headline denuncia-
tion. Such a consequence of constituency politics is inevitable; con-
* This comment is focused on the first volume, which discusses the Justice Depart-
ment's role in the antitrust area.
1 See Galbraith, The New Industrial State, 1 ANTITRUST LAW & ECON. REV. 11
(Winter, 1967), and the three subsequent articles commenting on Galbraith's position.
2 Nader, Introduction to THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM: THE NADER STUDY
GROUP REPORT ON ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT at ix (M. Green ed. 1971).
3 Recent publications include: THE CHEMICAL FEAST (J. Turner ed. 1970) (con-
cerning the practice of the Food and Drug Administration); CITIBANK (D. Leindorf ed.
1971) (reviewing New York City's First National Bank's activities); THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION (R. Fellmeth ed. 1970) (discussing the Commission's ef-
fectiveness); OLD AGE: THE LAST SEGREGATION (C. Townsend ed. 1970) (concerning
the problems of nursing homes); ONE LIFE - ONE PHYSICIAN (R. McClerry ed. 1970)
(scrutinizing the medical profession); and VANISHING AIR (J. Esposito ed. 1970) (re-
lating to air pollution problems).
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stituency population - and thereby power - grows in proportion
to the intensity of antiestablishment condemnation. A debilitating
side effect of this is that, as the sweep of the charges grows, so does
the difficulty, of proof.
The authors rely heavily on technique to cloak the gaps in credi-
bility. The methodology operates on two levels. First, a favorable
base of support in the literature is established by selective reference
to sources obviously favorable to the attack 4  Second, personal
interviews - in the pattern of what is labelled "the great . . . oral
tradition in the law"' - are exploited in such a manner as to give a
taint of objectivity to a cascade of value judgments. Neither method
is successful. If anything, slanted technique dramatizes sloppy work.
I
The interview technique proves vulnerable to an obvious indif-
ference to any type of disciplined and systematized program of in-
vestigation. The result is an impressionistic mosaic of generalities
embellished with journalistic stylisms ("It is rumored," "an anony-
mous official [said]," etc.)." Yet an even more critical defect is the
inability to effectively connect interview results to meaningful judg-
ments on the enforcement process. Reference to the section of the
Report dealing with the impact of "personality" on enforcement and
the competency of Antitrust Division staff verifies this deficiency.7
Shunning efforts to make and relate detailed findings on educa-
tion, experience, etc., to possible decision-making patterns, the au-
thors commit 89 pages8 to a gossipy discussion of high level Anti-
trust Division personnel and Attorneys General. What emerges is
a collection of banalities ("all of the AAG's [Assistant Attorneys
General] of the past decade have been men of competence and cau-
tion"), the obvious ("differences in temperament, ability to arouse
morale, and enforcement priorities were evident"), and unsupported
4 A glaring lapse is the use of an article by Posner to support a shared monopoly
argument See notes 73-81 infra & accompanying text.
5 Nader, supra note 2, at ix.
6 It would be interesting to know what standards (if any) were used in selecting in-
terviewees, the procedures and techniques used in setting up the interrogation process,
and the methods used to sift out bias.
71 THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM: THE NADER STUDY GROUP REPORT ON
ANITIRUsT ENFORCEMENT 125-214 (M. Green ed. 1971 [hereinafter cited as 1 EN-
TERPRISE].
8 d.
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value judgments (none of the AAG's mastered "policy planning"
or anything about concentration).9
The results are no more enlightening when the interview method
turns to the question of the "quality" of Antitrust Division lower
staff. For example, the statement is made that Division lawyers
"often resist the 'new economics.' "10 One is left uninformed as to
exactly what stands behind the resistance - lack of education or
philosophical distaste - and as to the scope of the purported resis-
tance." The authors summarize their findings with the conclusion
that the staff quality is "mixed." To assist the reader in discovering
just what "mixed" means, a potpourri of observations is presented:
"Many of the trial staff are indeed extremely able;" "Robert Ken-
nedy always turned to other Justice staff for his personally impor-
tant cases;- Donald Turner thought that the "trial staff were gen-
erally incompetent;" and, finally, "At the least, there is a layer of
'deadwood' or 'fat' in the legal staff."'"
The lacuna between this veneer of generalities and an interpre-
tive profile of the basic factors bearing on quality and competency of
staff is conspicuous. While obviously a difficult task to compile
and analyze data bearing on this problem, it is dearly within the
authors' self-addressed charge. At a minimum, information on work
experience, factors bearing on promotion, and the content of the
staff's educational background would be pertinent." Another seri-
ous omission is a failure to develop a profile of the decision makers
at the section level, a group of individuals who, on a daily basis,
make decisions affecting vast areas of commerce.
Technique also fails when the Raiders endeavor to probe the
impact of outside influence on the enforcement process. Accusing
the agencies of being participants in realpolitiks - "policy based
on power rather than ideals" 4 - an effort is made to establish in-
9 Id. at 209.
10 Id. at 241.
11 Indeed, it could be argued that present antitrust policy has embraced too much of
the "new economics." See Austin, A Priori Mechanical Jurisprudence in Antitrust,
53 MINN. L. REV. 739 (1969).
12 1 ENTERPRISE 234-35.
13 In the most widely acclaimed Nader study, E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ,
"THE NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969), a number of
personnel characteristics were considered, including educational background (grades in
law school, geographical region), standards for hiring, recruitment policies as to minor-
ities, time in grade or position, and percentages of attorneys in various grades. Id. at
130-59 & 225-30. For a critical view of the use of these factors, see Gelhorn, Book Re-
view, 68 MICH. L. REV. 151, 156-57 (1969).
14 1 ENTERPRISE 62, quoting from AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1009 (1966).
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fluence peddling as a prime contributor to lax enforcement. Sur-
mise, dramatics, 5 innuendo,"0 and a failure to dig up supporting
evidence produce an unconvincing and unproductive effort. In many
of the instances cited as reflecting "politiking," the enforcement
decisions remained fixed. Indeed, the Raiders come close to a flip-
flop, or at least confirm that their efforts are more an exercise in
gesture than in substantive investigation, by noting that influence
peddling occurs in "only a minority of cases."' 7
Meaningful insights into the subtleties of external influences on
enforcement do not emerge from celebrity interviewing. Every suit
could generate extra-court inputs from three sources: the target,
the target's competition (immediate and potential), and interested
third parties. Each source will seek to advance its position by one
or a combination of influence forms: (1) legal arguments, i.e., the
economic facts and legal theories relating to the specific charges;
(2) policy arguments, i.e., contentions directed to the possible ef-
fects on segments of society or on institutions (an example would
be the assertion that an intended merger would create new jobs or,
conversely, drain important resources from a given locality); and
(3) "ethically suspect" or clearly illegal forms of persuasion. This
last could include political trade-offs, such as support for the pas-
sage of legislation, or blatant bribery.
Dumping all contracts with the enforcement agencies into flip-
pant catchword categories like "influence peddling" and "politik-
ing" disregards these distinctions. Discussion of legal arguments can
sharpen the issues to the advantage of all concerned. And while
generally irrelevant, non-legal information might have a bearing on
a close case. It is, therefore, only the third category that is of con-
cern. This form of persuasion is, by the authors' own evaluation,
of such infrequent occurrence as to be a minimal factor. On bal-
ance, therefore, communication at all levels with enforcement agen-
15 While visiting the Antitrust Division, the then Governor Kirk of Florida "sta-
tioned his state troopers outside the door [purportedly as] a bullying tactic." 1 ENTER-
PRISE 85. Intimidation of Justice Department officials at 10th and Constitution Avenues
- then the home of the late J. Edgar Hoover and the F.B.I. - is difficult to accept.
16 In discussing Antitrust Division consideration of an impending merger, the au-
thors nonchalantly remark that:
Incriminating stock dealings point out one very likely motivation behind
the unusual actions of the Department. A Wall Street client of a prominent
Washington law firm has said that the Mudge, Rose law firm sent a message
reading "all contingencies are met," when discussing the merger with a block
of investors. Our source, a former Antitrust Division official who wishes to
remain anonymous, said that "they never would have sent such an encourag-
ing message unless they had inside information." 1 ENTERPRISE 93.
17Id. at 121.
1972]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23: 678
cies serves an important function and consequently should be en-
couraged.
Oblivious to pragmatics, The Closed Ente'prise System recom-
mends "that all meetings between businessmen and enforcement
officials from the level of Assistant Attorney General on up . . . be
made public by those petitioning."' 8 To suggest that publicizing ac-
cess would reach the jugular vein of the influence problem is to com-
pound the superficial with the simplistic. Endeavors to influence
by illegal means, a minimal problem by the Raiders' own account,
could easily maneuver through or around a registration process.
Conversely, sources who have traditionally contributed to enforce-
ment would be hesitant to become a part of the public record.
Confronted with the probability that his identity would become
known, the informant, a key to uncovering violations like price fix-
ing, would be loath to surface. Likewise, competitors of target com-
panies (especially small firms) would be less likely to present in-
formation if it meant, through the Raiders' proposed registration
book, forthcoming retaliation.
II
Turbulence from channelling economic theory and the norms of
business behavior through loose statutory language has resulted in a
stream of baffling decisions. Quick analysis and clear interpretation
of antitrust case law is generally difficult and sometimes impossible.
Contradictions and loose threads abound. Rarely, if ever, are cases
overruled. In the section on banking, a failure by the Raiders to
pay heed to these factors leads to a negligent examination of an im-
portant problem area.
In support of the assertion that bank merger activity was com-
pletely unmolested by the Antitrust Division prior to 1950, the
Raiders posit two reasons: first, the "publicly stated" view of an As-
sistant Attorney General that such mergers were exempt; and second,
the simple failure of the Division to act,' 9 even though it was fore-
seeable that Clayton section 720 applied to banking. Also empha-
sized is the fact that prior to Donald Turner's appearance at 10th
and Constitution Avenues, enforcement as to non-merger activity
"was nil, a spotless record of disregard for violations."' 21
18id. at 120.
19Id. at 502.
201 5 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
21 1 ENTERPRISE 514.
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This is gloss, misleading, and more calculated to conform to pre-
determined views than reflect reality. Not mentioned are the sig-
nificant factors that long shielded banking from any antitrust inter-
ference and that even today operate to render development of a
realistic enforcement policy extremely difficult.22  A maze of regula-
tions, created in response to a range of tensions - fear of insolvency,
conflicts between geographical regions, the presence of a pluralistic
system of banking, concern over the possible accumulation of capi-
tal in the hands of a few - reach nearly every facet of banking.
To accommodate this background, much of public regulation shel-
tered banking from the stresses of open competition,23 sometimes
to the extent that activity violative of the antitrust laws was con-
doned and encouraged.2
But a competition-softening policy is, as to certain functions,
no longer compatible with modern banking imperatives. For one
thing, depositor safety, a serious regulatory concern, is now virtually
guaranteed through federal insurance. Hence, conservative bank-
ing policy to assure liquidity and solvency no longer dominates
regulatory thinking. Equally significant has been the emergence
of a vigorous competitive urge among bankers, prompting ventures
into new banking related fields .2  The one-bank holding company
technique has proved to be an effective method for extending oper-
ations into nonbanking areas such as real estate, ranching and
even the pizza parlor business.2, Finally, there has been a clear
shift in philosophy: "It is settled law," Mr. Justice Brennan an-
nounced in Philadelphia National Bank, "that '[ilmmunity from
the antitrust laws is not lightly implied.' "27
. Given this background, it is disingenuous to accuse the Anti-
trust Division of having ignored blatant violations and to suggest
that merger proscription is belated. Even at this point, compel-
ling reasons exist for caution in antitrust intrusion. The industry con-
tinues to function within a matrix of regulations that directly and in-
directly affect or soften the tone of competition. For example, Regu-
2 See WaUich, Banks Need More Freedom to Compete, FoRTuNE, March 1970,
at 114.
2 3 See D. Jacobs, The Framework of Commercial Bank Regulation: An Appraisal,
in STUDIES IN BANKING COMPEnTiON AND BANING STRucTuRE 337, 342-43 (1966).
24 G. FiscHER, AmlucN BANKING STRucTuRI 247 (1968). See Rose, Are
Those 11,400 Banks Really Necessary, FORTUNE, Nov. 1970, at 113.
2 Wallich, supra note 22, at 143.
26 116 CONG. REc. 32, 123 (1970).
27 United States v. Philadelphia Nat Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963), quoting from
California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1961).
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lation Q28 precludes open price competition for demand deposits
and sets maximum price levels for time and savings deposits. Indig-
enous state branching laws interfere with uniform policy develop-
ment. Banking conduct, which at first blush appears to violate anti-
trust laws, might be justified when analyzed in the full context of
the banking process. 29  Ignoring critical essentials of the banking
process and sidestepping the rigors of a total evaluation of the in-
dustry's special characteristics constitutes a cop-out to the velvet-
lined groove of visceralized rhetoric. ° The Raiders are also con-
veniently spared the burden of making meaningful recommenda-
tions. 1
The discussion of the bank holding company issue, a problem
of major dimension, is inappropriately cursory. The authors merely
note that customers would patronize non-banking affiliates, espe-
cially during periods of tight money. Then, in a brief reference,
they acknowledge the passage of the Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments of 1970.32 Glossed over are the difficult enforcement
and detection problems posed by the subtle, but powerful form of
leverage that is inherent in the dispensation of credit. It is, for
example, highly doubtful whether the per se anti-tying provision of
the Bank Holding Company Act 3 3 can deal effectively with an "inde-
pendent" decision by a sophisticated customer to insure, by dealing
with the bank's affiliates, the present and future satisfaction of his
credit needs.3 4  Also strange, especially in light of the Report's ori-
28 12 U.S.C. §§ 371(a), (b) (1970).
2 9 An example is the compensating balance requirement. See Austin & Solomon,
The Antitrust Implications of Compensating Balances, 58 VA. L. REV. 1 (1972). It
is interesting to note that this widespread banking practice, pregnant with potential
abuses, received practically no attention in The Nader Raider Citibank study. CITI-
BANK, supra note 3, at 193-97.
30 Some of the lacunae in the discussion are undoubtedly due to the failure to in-
terview Dr. Elinor Solomon, financial economist attached to the Evaluation Section,
Antitrust Division, who has extensive experience and background in banking. Such an
egregious omission raises serious questions about the authors' over-all interview meth-
odology.
31 A likely starting point is the coordination of regulatory policy on a national basis
and the establishment of a national industry. See, e.g., Phillips, Competition, Confu-
sion, and Commercial Banking, 19 J. FINANCE 32, 45 (March, 1964).32 Act of Dec. 31, 1970, 84 Stat. 1760 [incorporated within 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-
1978 (1970)1.
33 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1970).
3 4 See Rose, The Case For the One-Bank Holding Company, FORTUNE, May 1969,
at 163, 332; Note, The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 39 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1200, 1226-27 (1971); Recent Developments, The Antitrust Laws and
One-Bank Holding Companies: Breaking into, the Piggy Bank, 18 CATHOLIC L REv.
524, 530 (1969).
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entation, is the failure to discuss the success of the banking lobby in
persuading Congress to "grandfather" substantial industry interests
from the effects of the amendments. 5
III
The reliability of the The Closed Enterprise System is irretriev-
ably dissipated by the authors' management of the oligopoly issue.
A fully developed treatment of oligopoly depends upon careful ex-
amination of two areas: first, the justification, through demonstra-
tion of harmful consequences, for mounting an attack; and second,
the existence of a reasonable means to dissolve the anticompetive
pressures. By omitting to set up a competitive frame of reference
for ascertaining harmful effects and by laying down a smokescreen
of value judgments so as to divert discussion of oligopoly effects
away from basic economic indicators, the authors fail to reach the
first area. An inability to cut through doctrine and case law ob-
scures treatment of remedies.
Justification for attack. The statement of justification for attack
does not include a definitive and pragmatic model of competition
- an important preface to any discussion of antitrust. What does
appear is a form of pure competition; consumer sovereignty, equilib-
rium pricing, decentralized markets of many sellers, and an absence
of non-price competition are espoused. As an analytical frame of
reference, pure competition assumes adherence to an abstracted and
static view of competition. In the dynamics of the marketplace,
deviations are inevitable. As a result, the competitive model as-
sumed for purposes of developing feasible antitrust policy is deter-
mined by the type, degree, and quality of deviations deemed desir-
able."' The problem with the presentation by The Closed Enter-
prise System is that there is no effort made to spell out exactly what
deviations should be permitted. "Mom and Popism" is eschewed
- which, without elaboration, says nothing. The argument is made
"for more $50 million firms and less billion dollar firms."a 7  Left
unexplained, however, is whether such firms would still be bound
to the strictures and theoretical imperatives of pure competition.
The tone of the discussion - an irrebuttable assumption of supra-
competitive pricing in oligopoly markets, harsh condemnation of
3 See S. MINTZ & J. COHEN, AMERICA, INc. 210-11 (1971); Anderson, Lobby-
ists Weaken Bank Holding Bill, The Washington Post, Sept. 15, 1970, at 21, col. 5.
36 See Bernhard, Competition in Law and in Economics, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 109-9
(1967); 1955 ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRusT REP. 315-42.
37 1 ENTERPISE 42.
19721
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23: 678
non-price competition such as product differentiation, and conclu-
sory assumptions as to anticompetitive effects of conglomeration
- point to a Nader Raider commitment to pure competition, per-
haps to the extent of "purifying the marketplace out of the 20th
century."
3 8
Undoubtedly mindful that constituencies are neither built nor
maintained on the unexciting, hard-nosed analysis and evaluation
of antitrust economics, the Raiders wave the flag of relevancy by ex-
panding coverage to include two sure headline items - pollution
and sociopolitical tensions. For example, oligopoly assertedly en-
courages "indifference" and "hostility" to pollution, the clear impli-
cation being that given a perfectly competitive market with no devi-
ations, the environment would quickly take on the trappings of a
Garden of Eden.
No space is committed to tracing a clear connection between
environmental problems and the structural condition of oligopoly.
Indeed, approximately 406 pages later, the difficulties of making such
a connection are conceded.39 Likewise, nothing is offered to support
the proposition that atomization of market structures would furnish
a route out of today's ecological dilemma. The unlikelihood of an
even balance of trade-offs suggests that wholesale divestiture would
make environmental improvement even more difficult. The stress
on resources prompted by atomization would have the immediate ef-
fect of pushing ecology off the budget, with no assurance of im-
proved economic performance as a trade-off. To put a twist on
the Schumpeterian thesis, it is perhaps reasonable to conclude that
the oligopolist, operating from the shelter of a protected profit posi-
tion, is better equipped than would be the theoretical "perfect"
competitor to expend sums on the research and development neces-
sary for quick relief.
Additional hyperbolized effects of oligopoly are fed to the con-
stituency. Expressing concern over Professor Scherer's conclusion
that monopoly profits constitute a redistribution of income from the
consuming public to the corporation," the authors ponder over the
innermost feelings of the average auto worker when he compares
his paltry salary to the $795,000 yearly income of the Chairman of
General Motors. Calamitous consequences are predicted: "One
3 8 A paraphrase of a comment in context from J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, FAIR COM-
PETITION: THE LAw AND ECONoMICs OF ANTITRUST POLICY 31 (1954).
39 See note 95 infra & accompanying text.
4 0 F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
408-09 (1970).
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wonders how long any society can continue, with extremes of pov-
erty and wealth such as ours, and not invite retaliation by those it
economically mistreats."41  Likewise, the political influence of the
ubiquitous oligopolist is extrapolated into an Orwellian scenario
where a cartelized business establishment employs McCarthyite tac-
tics to manipulate an oppressed labor force.
A loosely formulated and impassioned fishing expedition into
the labyrinth of employee attitudes needlessly detracts from the more
pertinent and manageable question of oligopoly economics. More-
over, even on the merits the value judgments are shaky; in the high-
paying auto industry, job enrichment is a more volatile issue than
wage scales or the salaries of company officers.4 2 Likewise, the pos-
sibility of a divestiturized market structure having measurable ef-
fects on desirable sociopolitical goals is remote. In the words of
a knowledgeable economist:
It is the irrelevance of the social-political objectives to the anti-
trust laws that renders so ironical in antitrust decisions, particularly
in recent merger decisions, the citations and the talk about a small-
business-way of life. Even if the Clayton Act as well as the Sher-
man Act were given the most drastic, radical, sweeping interpreta-
tion that anybody anywhere has even proposed, the impact on the
distribution of property, on self employment, on independent cen-
ters of initiative rather than employment of the many by the few
- all of these would be absolutely zero. Alleged social and po-
litical objectives are nothing but a nuisance and a distraction - a
red herring drawn across the trail, irrespective of any opinions
about the desirability of having a greater amount of self employ-
ment and fewer people working at the direction of others.48
Moreover, the introduction of sociopolitical factors shifts the
focus to the multi-faceted problem area of overall governmental
reform. In this broad frame of reference, conclusions on the po-
litical role and the societal impact of business interests must be pro-
grammed into the total political process. One could, in a too-brief
overview, note that the political clout of business is dampened
considerably by the countervailing thrust of organized labor, the
farm lobby, plus a myriad of other pressure groups. Any success-
ful alteration of the existing distribution of leverage would require
considerably more than an attack on concentration. Professor Bain
frames the proper perspective: "Concentrations of political power
in big businesses is only one major phrase of concentration of polit-
41 1 ENTERPRISE 35.
4 2 Gooding, Blue-Collar Blues otn the Assembly Line, FORTUNE, July 1970, at 69.
4 3 Adelman, An Economist Looks at the Sherman Act, 27 ABA ANTITRUsT SECTION
32 (1965).
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ical power generally. Reversion to a more primitive sort of de-
mocracy would require much more than just a reduction in business
concentration. 44
The remedies. Whether the result of poor resource allocation, ca-
pitulation to political and business pressures, or simply a pervasive
mood of bureaucratic oblomovism, the Government's failure to re-
spond to concentration is viewed as being especially reprehensible
in light of the existence of "adequate doctrinal props" for mount-
ing a successful attack.45 The Raiders' censure fails to rise above its
defects; result-oriented myopia induces one-sided evaluation of case
law and incomplete reading of secondary source material, culminat-
ing in anfractuous presentation of purported "doctrinal props." Re-
ferring to "strains" from key decisions, the authors advance their
obscurely phrased deconcentration formula: "[T]aken together
[these cases] reveal a developing doctrine that (a) monopoly power,
(b) common oligopoly behavior and (c) shared monopoly itself
may be violative of the antitrust laws. 46
This is mangled and rough-hewn syntax. The reader must
shoulder the difficult burden of relating cited decisions to shifting
context so as to ascertain meaning. Apparently the authors are sug-
gesting that the Sherman Act47 may be violated by monopoly power
maintained over a substantial period of time, or by the uniform be-
havior of oligopolists, or by the sharing of monopoly power. These
are not new concepts, each having provoked commentary and con-
troversy. They have never, however, been presented in such emaci-
ated and unauthoritative form.
Alcoa48 is said to stand for the proposition that monopoly power
preserved over a lengthy period of time, and not the result of pat-
ents or economies of scale, is per se illegal. In support of this
reading, the authors cite Judge Hand's statement that a vice of the
defendant's market power was a capacity to "embrace each new op-
portunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity
already geared into a great organization ... [having the advantage
of experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel] 41
(bracketed portion not quoted by the authors). Standing alone,
this remark persuasively supports the authors' position. It suggests
4 4 J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 92 (2d ed. 1968).
45 1 ENTERPRISE 411.
46 d. at 418.
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
4 8 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
49 1 ENTERPRISE 415, quoting from 148 F.2d at 431.
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that exclusionary or even "normal" conduct is irrelevant and that
dominant market occupation alone suffices for proscription. The
statement is, however, contradicted by another remark of Hand's
(and one that the authors apparently assume to be part of the hold-
ing) to the effect that an exception to proscription is the monopolist
who "may be the survivor out of a group of active competitors,
merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry."5
Presumably the exonerating "skill, foresight and industry" would
be an important part of meeting newcomers with advantages of
experience, trade connections and elite personnel - the very conduct
condemned in the other passage.
The dash of these passages, a puzzle to observers, 51 is ignored
by the Raiders. Also ignored is United States v. Grinnell Corp.,'
which might be interpreted to have resolved the conflict in a manner
unfavorable to the authors' position. Mr. Justice Douglas said,
"[tjhe offense of monopoly under section 2 of the Sherman Act
has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a con-
sequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci-
dent." 3  Another limitation on the authors' monopoly power the-
ory - also disregarded - is the fact that in Alcoa Hand could point
to instances of exclusionary conduct obviously part of a design to
block out all potential entrants and dearly going beyond "superior
skill, foresight and industry." Finally, the authors discount the fact
that subsequent decisions have not seen fit to exploit the Alcoa case
in a way consistent with an interpretation that monopoly power is
per se illegal.54 That the Alcoa decision is more polemic than pre-
cedent seems to have general support.55 The sum result of the
50 1 ENTERPRISE 415, quoting from 148 F.2d at 430.
51 See Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82
HARV. L REV. 1207, 1218 (1969). Turner does not engage in reconciliation. He
reads Alcoa as permitting the acquisition of power so long as attributable to accident
or competitive superiority, but condemning power retained over a substantial period of
time. Turner, supra, at 1219. He acknowledges that his is not necessarily a conclusive
reading: "Judge Hand's opinion ... comes very close to saying [that monopoly power
retained over a substantial period of time can be illegal, subject to unexpired patents
and economics of scale]; indeed, perhaps it does." Id. at 1217.
5 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
53 Id. at 570-71 (1966).
54 ABA ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968 at 36 (1968).
55 See J. DnuLAM & A. KAHN, supra note 38, at 58-69; A. NEALE, THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 112 (2d ed. 1970); F. SCHERER,
supra note 40, at 463. Bain concludes that proof of some sort of exclusionary conduct,
which "may consist entirely or mainly of normal business practices or policies having
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Raiders' disinclination to face up to these points is an underdeveloped
and flawed presentation of a fundamental component in their de-
concentration plan. This unwillingness to meet contra arguments
head-on carries over into discussion of both oligopoly behavior
and shared monopoly.
Both lawyers and economists are intrigued by the implications of
seemingly parallel behavior of oligopolists. To the theorist, mutual
interdependence leads to uniform conduct; programmed anticipatory
reaction by each oligopolist becomes the single judgment on pricing,
advertising, and product differentiation. Hence, where "common
oligopoly behavior" is involved, proof of conspiracy or combination
is both unnecessary and irrelevant.
Whatever the merits of this argument, 6 the courts have not,
contrary to what the authors suggest, embraced conscious parallel-
ism. Reference to selected passages from American Tobacco57 can-
not turn the holding of that case from reliance on traditional con-
spiracy doctrine. The Cement Institute5 case, which the authors
also look to for support, is the Supreme Court's strongest feint in
the direction of conscious parallelism. The Court, noting the uni-
formity of the defendants' behavior, commented by way of foot-
note dictum that a finding of combination is warranted if "there is
evidence that persons, with knowledge that concerted action was
contemplated and invited, give adherence to and then participate
in a scheme."5 9 The marginal nature of this as authority was dem-
onstrated subsequently in Theatre Enterprises," where Mr. Justice
Clark remarked that "[clircumstantial evidence of consciously par-
allel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional
judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has
not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely."'" Mini-
exclusionary effect and inferentially exclusionary purpose," is necessary. J. BAIN, supra
note 44, at 544. See also D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 238-39
(1959).
5 6 For critical views of various oligopoly assumptions see W. BALDWIN, ANTITRUST
AND THE CHANGING CORPORATION 248-49 (1961); J. CLARK, COMPETITION AS A
DYNAMIC PROCESS 471-77 (1961); G. HALE & R. HALE, MARKET POWER: SIZE AND
SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT 134-37 (1958); C. HARRISS, THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES AND POLICIES 343-46 (rev. ed. 1956); A. KAPLAN,
BIG ENTERPRISE IN A COMPETITIVE SYSTEM 50-53 (rev. ed. 1964).
57 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
58 FTCv. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
591d. at 716 n.17.
60 Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
61 Id. at 541.
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mizing this language as a "verbal setback,"6 2 as the Raiders do in
a footnote, cannot disguise the fact that there is nothing on the
record of case law to indicate that Justice Clark's evaluation has
been repudiated or revised.6'
Shared monopoly, the capstone of the Nader deconcentration
strategy," is considered to be the logical extension of the monopoly
per se proscriptive interpretation of Alcoa. Where monopoly power
is shared by a few large firms, the same proscriptive result is deemed
appropriate. There are at least two variants of the doctrine. One
version, "pure" shared monopoly, is grounded in unessayed theory
which eschews combination and conspiracy. The activities of each
oligopolist blends and interacts so as to constitute, in a collective
sense, the responsible force in creating the same type of noncompet-
itive environment as would exist under monopoly. Each oligopolist
exercises shared monopoly power within the context of the other's
activities. Since each firm contributes and benefits from the total
impact of its respective market position, each monopolizes. 65
A less venturesome approach is to resort to an allegation of com-
bination or conspiracy to monopolize.6" The gravamen of the charge
remains the same: monopoly power, wielded by sharing and con-
spiring oligopolists, is susceptible to attack. An important advan-
tage is that a cautious judiciary is more likely to accept a doctrine
with familiar underpinnings. Moreover, conspiracy or combination
can be established by at least three methods. First, overt conduct
or circumstantial evidence of combination might be available.6 Sec-
ond, tacit agreement might be found in decisional interdependence
62 1 ENTERPRisE 418.
68See ABA ANTiTRusT DEVELOPMENTs, supra note 54, at 22-23. This is not-
withstanding any "new" interpretation put on "combination" in Albrecht v. Herald Co.,
390 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968). See generally Baker, Combintaions and Conspiracies-
Is There a Difference?, 14 ANTrTRusT BULL. 71 (1969).64 See letter from Ralph Nader to Emanuel Cellar and Philip Hart, appearing in
ATRR, Jan. 5, 1971, D-1 (No. 494).65 Levy, Some Thoughts on "Antitrust Policy" and the Antitrust Community, 45
MNN. L. REV. 963, 980 (1961); Rahl, Conspiracy and the Antitrust Laws, 44 ILL. L.
REV. 743, 756-57 (1950).66 Turner's approach is somewhere between these two: he would impose section 2
liability where oligopolists engaged in otherwise "normal" conduct that has exclusionary
effects when implemented on an industry-wide basis. As an example, he mentions the
industry-wide practice of distributing machines by lease and not by sale; if, in a three-
firm oligopoly, only one of the three firms was leasing, justification for condemnation
would be difficult. Turner, supra note 51,.at 1230-31. The FTC apparently followed
Turner's rationale in a recently filed proposed complaint. Note, The Bus Tire Case:
The FTC's New Approach to Concentrated Markets, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1169 (1971).67 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
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of oligopolists. Where it is clear that the self-interest of each firm
is protected only if parallel behavior emerges, a finding of tacit
agreement is justified.6" A third possibility is to blend Sherman Sec-
tion 1" conspiracy pleadings with Sherman Section 2" allegations. 7
Which form of the doctrine appeals most to The Closed Enter-
prise System is hidden in incoherence and unintelligible meanderings.
Indeed, the treatment of shared monopoly has been so badly mis-
managed as to raise serious doubts as to the authors' ability to en-
gage in the rudiments of basic research. Analytical insights do not
emerge from the cryptic comment that "combining Alcoa with
American Tobacco leads [to shared monopoly], ' 7' especially in light
of the authors' superficial analysis of these cases. Any possibility
of development of rational theory disappears when the authors opt
to invoke an article by Professor Posner 73 as support for a Turner
statement that individual and shared monopoly deserve the same
treatment.74  The Closed Enterprise System says:
Conservative economist Richard Posner agrees. But he antici-
pates the criticisms that: oligopolists are only behaving as market
structure compels them to behave (Ford has to look at GM's prices
and raise their own equally if their profits will increase); and that
any court decree forbidding such future behavior will therefore be
worthless (you can't ask firms to be antirational). Posner responds
that oligopoly pricing is voltntary, not inevitable. The following
practices - the correctable costs of a shared monopoly - are
listed by him as justifiably triggering a Sherman Act violation:
systematic price discrimination; prolonged excess capacity; refusal
to offer discounts during substantial excess capacity; infrequent and
identical price changes; very abnormal profits; announcement of
price increases far in advance; public statements concerning the
"correct price;" fixed market shares for a long period of time; and
identical sealed bids on non-standard items. Posner also urges dis-
solution of the existing oligopoly structure as relief which would
help guarantee a return to competitive pricing.75
Use of the Posner article is puzzling. The purpose of that piece
is to develop a logical doctrine for dealing with non-collusive oligo-
68 See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
69 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
70 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
71 Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHL
L. REV. 567, 585 (1947).
72 1 ENTERPRISE 418.
13 Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REv. 1562 (1969).
74 Turner, supra note 51, at 1230. Turner thereby rejects his previously stated view
in C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 21, 110-11 (1959).
75 1 ENTERPRISE 419-20.
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polistic supra-competitive pricing under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. It is a rebuttal to the view that the non-collusive pricing issue
"constitutes an economically and legally distinct problem requiring
new doctrines and new remedies for its solution."7' 6 The practices
and conditions listed by Posner would trigger a Section I tacit col-
lusion violation,7 and not, as the authors imply, a shared monopoly
violation. While Sherman Section 1 price conspiracy could be a
factor in establishing a shared monopoly by combination or con-
spiracy, the authors do not establish that context in their reference
to Posner's article.
Most significantly, law professor Posner does not, in a short
three-page tangential discussion of joint monopolization,78 set forth
any pronouncements that could possibly be construed by the most
sanguine Nader Raider as evidencing acceptance of Professor
Turner's views on shared monopoly. To the contrary, Posner ques-
tions the wisdom of a hard-line Alcoa interpretation, remarking
that "[elven in its original context of single-firm monopoly, the
Alcoa doctrine seems open to serious question."79  When he pro-
ceeds to the oligopoly problem, Posner's lack of sympathy for the
shared monopoly argument is inescapable: "If the Alcoa doctrine
seems inappropriate as a solution to the problems raised by single-
firm monopoly, it seems doubly inappropriate as applied to oligo-
poly." 80
In addition, the impression is given that Posner considers dissolu-
tion to be the standard remedy for noncompetitive oligopoly pricing.
Posner says: "There may be extreme cases where dissolution is the
appropriate remedy for convicted tacit colluders because repetition of
the offense is difficult to prevent by other means. Ordinarily the
conventional remedies should be adequate, but courts should not
shrink from employing dissolution in an exceptional case.",,'
76 Posner, supra note 73, at 1562. Posner directs his criticisms to Professor Turner's
views as reflected in Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655 (1962).
77 Posner, supra note 73, at 1578-87.
78Id. at 1595-98.
70Id. at 1596.
80 ld. at 1597.
811d. at 1591 (emphasis added). Even the most cursory reading of the Posner
article would uncover his distaste for dissolution: "Furthermore, dissolution . . . is
neither the only possible remedy for noncompetitive pricing by oligopolists . . . nor
generally the best remedy." Id. at 1594. "It follows that antitrust policy should empha-
size the prevention of practices by which market power is obtained or exploited, but
steer generally clear of radical structural remedies." Id. at 1597. "It follows that if my
proposal to employ section I of the Sherman Act against tacit collusion is rejected as un-
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The authors' inability to draft a clear statement of shared monop-
oly doctrine dramatizes the problems standing in front of its use by
the enforcement establishment. Even in a most favorable light, the
doctrine is a substantial departure from existing law. There is in-
exorable stress in taking decisions that have been decided in one
context, and extending them to a new context. The formidable au-
thority discounting the likelihood of such an extension cannot be
ignored.82 The Neal Report succinctly evaluates the present status
of shared monopoly by stating that no case has "yet provided a basis
for treating as illegal the shared monopoly power of several firms
that together possess a predominant share of the market, absent
proof of conspiracy among them. '83 Moreover, use of shared mo-
nopoly suits might have unwelcome side effects. Medium sized
firms, fearful of extending market control and thereby provoking
shared monopoly attack, might use supracompetitive pricing as a
means of curtailing further growth. 84
Finally, any discussion of the adequacy of the shared monopoly
doctrine is incomplete without recognition that its use would en-
tail new and possibly exhausting burdens on trial courts. The fact
that courts presently have an uncomfortable time in shifting through
the unfamiliar "morass of economic data"85 that accompanies every
antitrust suit magnifies the significance of new burdens. For exam-
ple, a considerable portion of time and energy would be occupied
with developing an economic basis for making a finding as to the
necessary level of combined market shares that would trigger a viola-
tion.8" Most cases would involve prolonged conflict over the identi-
fication of participants in the "sharing;" all cases would pose sticky
feasible, the alternative of applying radical structural remedies in highly concentrated
markets should, on the basis of present knowledge, also be rejected." Id. at 1598.
8 2 See p CAVES, AMERICAN INDUsTRY: STRucTURE, CoNDucT, PERFORMANCE 63
(2d ed. 1967); D. DEWEY, supra note 55, at 239-56; A. NEALE, supra note 55, at 125;
Cox, Competition and Sectiop 2 of the Sherman Act, 27 ABA ANTITRUST SECrIoN 72,
85 (1965); Harbeson, A New Phase of the Antitrust Law, 45 MICH. L REV. 977, 985
(1947); Johnston & Stevens, Monopoly or Monopolization - A Reply to Professor Ros-
tow, 44 ILL. L. REV. 269 (1949); Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 28 (1953). See also, L. WEISS, ECONOMICS AND AMERICAN INDUSTRY 207
(1961).
83 Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, reprinted at 115 CONG. REC. 13890,
13892 (1969).
84 Posner raises this possibility in discussing the feasibility of dissolution legisla-
tion. Posner, supra note 73, at 1595.
85 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 n.1 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
86 j. BAIN, supra note 44, at 547.
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divestiture problems. Additional sand in the trial machinery would
come from the inevitable shotgun complaint. Since it is unlikely
that the government would risk everything on a "pure" shared
monopoly suit, the court would be further inundated with the task
of wading through evidence dealing with "conduct not honestly in-
dustrial" and with evidence supporting inferences of combination. 8
If analysis of the shared monopoly doctrine is mutilated, presen-
tation of the alternative method of attacking oligopoly - decon-
centration by statute - is little more than sterile duplication of the
Kaysen-Turner89 and Neal Report 0 recommendations which would
atomize oligopolistic market structures by divestiture. 1 The authors
are, as one would expect, more severe; they would decree an irrebut-
table presumption against an economies defense and would make
attack mandatory.
Discussion of support for such a drastic move is cursory and
unconvincing. The economic justification - "super (sic) -compet-
itive prices" ' 2 is briefly alluded to and recognized as being tenta-
tive. The heart of the raison d'etre for congressional action is
thereby permitted to slip past the reader within the space of a few
seconds. 3 The noneconomic justification - vices such as pollution,
inflation, concentration of political power, etc. 4 - are deflated by
the authors themselves who, in a characteristic flip-flop, admit the
difficulty of producing any sort of statistical correlation between
oligopoly and noneconomic "evils.""5  Hence, after the Nader
Raider verbiage is raked aside, The Closed Enterprise System's case
for drastic legislative surgery is staked on nothing more than a value
8 7 Turner notes that a lack of symmetry could pose divestiture problems. "Sup-
pose, for example, a three-firm industry in which the market shares are 50, 30, and 20
per cent respectively, and in which maximum economies of sale are reached at around
15 per cent of the market. Divestiture would be appropriate for the larger two firms
but not for the smallest." Turner, supra note 51, at 1231 n.45.
88 This seems to be the FTC's approach in their suit against General Mills, Quaker
Oats, Kellogg, and General Foods. See ATRR, Jan. 25, 1972, D-1, (No. 547).
89 C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST PoLIcy: AN EcoNoM1c AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS (1965).
9 0 Supra note 83.
91 Also discussed as an anti-oligopoly weapon is the "sweep-back" doctrine from
United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
92 1 ENTERPRISE 439.
93 This defect is not cured by referring the reader to the first chapter of the book,
Economics of Antitrust, which is itself poorly developed. See notes 39-44 supra & ac-
companying text.
9 See 1 ENTERPRISE 439.
95Id.
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judgment that "Bigness (whatever the context and economic config-
uration) is Bad."96
IV
It has not been done well. It reads like the work of a ha-
rassed undergraduate hoping against reason that his senior thesis,
compiled in three horrendous nights of scissors, paste and black
coffee, will be accepted on grounds that he will not graduate
[otherwise] . . . .97
The defects in The Closed Enterprise System are of sufficient
proportion to raise doubts about the capacity of the Center for Study
of Responsive Law to effectively allocate resources, or indeed whether
they have competent resources to allocate. Much of the material
is nothing more than a dilettantish rehash of existing knowledge.
The interview method fails to uncover new or significant facts on
antitrust enforcement, policy procedure, or personality. Other than
a survey of judicial attitudes towards antitrust, the only material not
available prior to the release of the report are the Nader Raider
self-serving interpretations of doctrine and events. In terms of
first level analysis and evaluation there is, in brief, a manifest
inability or disinclination to handle the basics of antitrust in candor
and with balance. In this respect, The Closed Enterprise System
justifies the recent concern of Nader supporters that he "is hurting
their common cause by speaking out too often on too many subjects
and . . . not documenting his arguments adequately." 8
The report's poor quality has broader implications for the Nader
movement. A primary purpose of the Nader reformation is the re-
structuring of the corporate establishment. Through various tech-
niques ("popularization of the boardroom," for example) " corpo-
rate priorities are to be rearranged. Different inputs - pollution,
racial inequities, and income distribution - are to be fed into the
decision-making process with first priority. In this context, The
Closed Enterprise System constitutes an effort at justifying the use
906 For criticism of the Neal Report recommendations see Brazen, The Antitrust
Task Force Deconcentration Recommendation, 13 J. LAW & EcoN. 279 (1970); Keyes,
The Proposed Concentrated Industries Act: A Critique, 15 ANTiTRuST BULL. 469
(1970); Markham, Antitrust Policy: Challenge and Defense, 28 WAsH. & LEE L. REV.
287, 303-07 (1971).
97 Daniel P. Moynihan made this statement commenting on the UN's Report on the
World Social Situation, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1971, at 14, col. 5.
98 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Nov. 8, 1971, at 12.
99 BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 28, 1970, at 88.
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of antitrust enforcement machinery as another vehicle for imple-
menting the Nader reformation.
It is an ineffectual and unsuccessful effort. In 1,148 pages, sup-
port for the major premise that the market place, as presently con-
stituted, is the Typhoid Mary of the social and political evils of the
day never emerges above the level of rhetoric. Furthermore, The
Closed Enterprise System fails to demonstrate the appropriateness of
using the antitrust enforcement process as a conduit for feeding
social and political value judgments into the system. In urging a
move away from an economic frame of reference for antitrust de-
cision making, the authors are unequal to the task of providing in-
sights as to how to overcome the present absence of methods and
procedures for measuring economic efficiencies against possible so-
cial and political benefits. 100
ARTHUR D. AUSTIN*
100 See Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 CHI. L. REV. 500 (1971);
Bork, Antitrust in Dubious Battle, FORTUNE, Sept. 1969, at 103-04.
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19721
